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Berkeley’s Idealist Theory of
Knowledge and Whether or Not
Empiricism Can Lead To
Idealism
Stacey MacPherson
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Bert Koegler,
Professor of Philosophy
Abstract
George Berkeley is perhaps one
of the most unique and intriguing
figures in the history of modern
philosophy. Dissatisfied with and
angered by the materialist
philosophies of his contemporaries,
especially the ideas of John Locke,
Berkeley called for a return to
"common sense." But "common
sense," for Berkeley, involved not just
a skeptical view of materialism, but
the assertion that the material world
does not exist at all! Berkeley utilizes
persuasive logical arguments and
empiricist principles in order to refute
the existence of matter. However,
when he attempts to account for what
does exist, he makes a startling claim
which does not hold up to his own
rigorous logical standards.
The empiricist project has always
been concerned with the argument that
knowledge is based upon experience
rather than innate ideas. In its pursuit of
knowledge about things other than the
contents of our own minds, empiricism
seeks to get us out of the mind and into
the “real” world. George Berkeley, one
of the most unlikely empiricists, sought
to utilize the empiricist argument in
order to prove his extremely unorthodox
theory - that matter does not exist and
that all the things we perceive are really

ideas in the mind of God. This paper will
detail the way in which Berkeley uses
logical arguments in order to essentially
transform empiricism into idealism. We
will first discuss Berkeley’s critique of
Locke’s distinction between primary and
secondary qualities. We will then
examine how Berkeley denies Locke’s
theory of representational realism and
how Berkeley then leads us to his
conclusion that nothing exists except
ideas. Finally, we will discuss some of
the problems with Berkeley’s theory and
ask whether or not empiricism does
indeed lead to idealism.
Berkeley begins his argument
with an attack on John Locke’s
distinction between primary and
secondary qualities. Locke attempted to
show that the qualities we sense
regarding objects can be separated into
two categories. According to Locke,
qualities which are dependent on the
mind’s ability to perceive them, such as
color, sound, taste and temperature, are
secondary qualities. Primary qualities,
however, exist within the object and
continue to exist whether one perceives
them or not. The primary qualities
include weight, shape, dimension and
motion. Essentially, the primary
qualities all add up to the idea of
extension. According to Locke, the
extension of objects is a fact that cannot
be denied. We can do all kinds of things
to an object – paint it a different color,
change the way it tastes or smells, move
it to a different location, slice it up, crush
it, etc. But no matter what we do to the
object, it remains extended. Extension
cannot be possible without material
substance. Therefore, according to
Locke, we can say we know that matter
exists and that matter is the substance,
which underlies all extended objects. It
must be noted that Locke does admit that

we do not have direct access to the
underlying substance. Instead, we have
direct access only to our ideas, but we
can trust that our ideas represent the
actual external world. (As we shall see,
Berkeley will demolish this argument
too.)
In the first of Three Dialogues
Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley
tears apart Locke’s distinction between
primary and secondary qualities and
leads us to the counter-intuitive
conclusion that matter does not exist.
Berkeley argues that primary qualities
are just as subjective as secondary
qualities. In other words, there is no
distinction between the two categories at
all. He begins by establishing a basic
foundation of empiricism - that we know
things only through sense experience.
Berkeley, in the voice of Philonous,
takes Hylas (meant to be Locke) through
such secondary qualities as heat and
cold, taste, sound and color. He uses the
following example to refute the
existence of heat or cold in an object. A
person can make one of his hands cold
and the other hot. The same person can
then put both hands into a single vessel
of lukewarm water. The water will feel
cold to the hot hand and warm to the
cold hand. But it would be a
contradiction to say that the same water
is both cold and hot at the same time.
Therefore, temperature exists in the
mind and not in the object. Essentially,
Berkeley merely confirms what Locke
has already admitted – that secondary
qualities are entirely subjective and exist
only within the mind of the perceiver.
But Berkeley goes much further
than this. He next attacks the idea of
primary qualities and shows that the
primary qualities are also minddependent and therefore do not exist
within the object. Philonous proves to

Hylas that dimension and size are
subjective by getting Hylas first to admit
that all perceiving animals should
perceive the same dimensions of an
object if indeed dimension is inherent in
the object itself. Philonous then talks
about the foot of a mite. The mite
perceives its own foot as a certain size
relative to the mite’s body. But to Hylas,
and other larger animals, the mite’s foot
is so tiny that it cannot even be seen with
the naked eye. In other words, to a very
small animal, an anthill can seem like a
mountain, while to a larger animal the
same anthill will seem tiny. And again, it
would be a logical contradiction to state
that the same thing can be both huge and
tiny at the same time. Therefore, since
all animals can have a different
perception of size regarding the same
object, then dimension is subjective. But
is this a sound argument? Can’t there be
one “true” size of the mite’s foot – an
objective and actual size? Based on the
foundation we started with – that all we
can know are things we perceive with
the senses – the answer is no. There
cannot be any knowledge of a “true” size
if knowledge is only possible through
sense perception. Therefore, size is not
an inherent quality in the object itself.
Philonous uses the same
principles to refute the objective
existence of motion, shape, solidity and
extension. But what about the idea that
there can be a distinction between
“absolute” extension and “sensible”
extension? For example, can’t we admit
that we perceive size differently simply
due to our own size in relation to the
object? Likewise, can’t we assert that we
perceive extension differently due to our
own distance from an object? In other
words, can’t there still be a true and
absolute quality of size and a true and
absolute quality of extension that exists

within the object, no matter how the
object is perceived by our mind?
Berkeley says this is impossible. There
cannot be any such thing as “absolute”
extension. In order to make a case for
such a thing as absolute extension, one
would have to conceive of extension in
an abstract form. In other words, one
must be able to think of pure extension,
without relating such extension to any
object. Berkeley says this is impossible
because nobody can conceive of pure
extension – we always must assume
some thing which is extended. The
world is comprised of particulars – not
of abstractions. Even if we try to argue
that extension is the quality common to
all extended things and that motion is the
quality common to all moving things, we
are effectively asserting nothing at all.
We are admitting that we do not know
anything definitive about what we call
“extension” or “motion”.
Berkeley remains consistent in
his logic by sticking to the empiricist
principle that all we can really know are
“sensible” things. If all we know are
sensible things and our senses constantly
furnish us with different data regarding
the “same” object, then we cannot know
anything at all about the object itself.
And because abstraction is invalid, we
cannot say that anything like “true” size
or “absolute” extension exists. By
dismantling all arguments in favor of
Locke’s primary qualities, and by
demolishing the very concept of
extension, Berkeley has effectively
refuted that there can be any knowledge
of the existence of material substance.
And, again, if all we can know are
sensible things, and, according to
Berkeley’s argument, we cannot know
material substance, then there is no
logical way to assert that material
substance exists. We must remember

that Berkeley’s goal is not to simply put
forth skepticism with regard to material
substance, but to actually deny material
substance. This of course is crucial to his
project, which is to prove that the world
consists only of ideas. By denying the
existence of matter, Berkeley denies the
existence of the external world. But then
what does exist? According to Berkeley,
only ideas exist. And if the refutation of
matter is not enough to convince us of
this fact, then Berkeley has another
argument to prove that nothing can exist
except ideas.
In his second argument, Berkeley
refutes Locke’s theory of
representational realism. Locke asserted
that external objects exist and that we
receive data about the external world
through our sense perceptions. Locke
admitted that we do not have direct
access to the object itself – we only can
directly know our own ideas with regard
to the object. But to avoid skepticism
and to assert that we can have
knowledge of the external world, Locke
proposed that our ideas are
representations of the real objects. In
other words, although we can only
directly know our ideas, we can trust that
our ideas actually represent the “real”
things. Ideas in the mind are reflections
of nature.
Berkeley strikes down this theory
with two major arguments. First he asks
how can it be possible for us to know
that our ideas truly reflect the real thing?
If Locke agrees that we only have direct
access to our minds, then how can we
ever be “outside” our minds in order to
compare our ideas with the things they
supposedly represent? This one question
strikes a serious blow to Locke’s theory.
If we cannot be in a position to compare
ideas in the mind with objects in the real
world, then we simply cannot know

whether or not our ideas truly represent
real things. In order for a comparison to
take place, we need to have access to
both things which are being compared.
According to Berkeley, Locke makes an
invalid inference when he asserts that
our ideas represent reality. We simply
cannot know this with any certainty at
all.
This brings Berkeley to another
argument regarding the unbridgeable gap
between ideas and the “real” world.
Since ideas cannot ever be compared
with reality, then it would seem that the
mind and the external world are of two
different substances. Although it seems
intuitively correct that there is a
distinction between mind and matter,
and that both mind and matter exist, the
idea of substance dualism creates many
problems for epistemologists. Dualism
poses a question which is still being
asked today – how do the two distinct
substances of mind and matter interact
with one another? What exactly is the
connection between the body and the
mind, and how can one affect the other?
Berkeley argues that two unlike
substances cannot causally act on each
other. After establishing that we only
perceive sensible things, and that
sensible things are all mind-dependent,
he concludes that there can only be one
substance – that of ideas or the mind.
The argument is as follows. We have
already established that we can only
know sensible things – things accessed
through the senses. But since “sensible”
things are all mind-dependent, then the
material world (if it exists) is itself
“insensible”. That which is sensible
cannot be like that which is insensible.
Therefore, only sensible things can
affect sensible things. In other words,
only ideas can affect ideas. As Berkeley
states in the voice of Philonous, “In a

word, can anything be like a sensation or
idea, but another sensation or idea?”
(Three Dialogues…Part II, Section 241)
Therefore, only ideas can exist.
And here is Berkeley’s main
thesis. There is no evidence to support
the theory of an external world. In fact,
the existence of a material world is
contrary to logic. Therefore, of the two
proposed substances – mind and matter –
only mind can exist. Reality is composed
of ideas, and since we have direct access
to our ideas, there is no gap between our
knowledge and reality. But without an
external world, where do all our ideas
come from? According to Berkeley,
they come from God.
This is the problematic part of
Berkeley’s theory. So far, he has used
logical arguments to deny the existence
of matter and has led us to question what
our intuition has always told us – that
there is a material world and that it is
this material world which comprises
reality. But why does he now jump to a
seemingly unfounded conclusion – that
God exists and that “reality” is
comprised of ideas in the mind of God?
Well, he does have an argument for this,
and we shall discuss whether or not the
argument is a good one. (From here
onward, when we refer to “reality” and
“real” things, we mean not a material
reality but Berkeley’s definition of
reality – reality as ideas.)
Berkeley’s argument is as follows:
1. We have established that only
ideas exist and that reality is
comprised of ideas.
2. For an idea to be existing, it
must be perceived by
someone or something.
3. But real things continue to
exist even when no person is

perceiving them. (For
example, when everyone
leaves the room, the room
does not disappear.)
4. Therefore, ideas which are
unperceived by people must
still be perceived by
something.
5. That something else is the
infinite mind of God.
In other words, all of nature
continues to exist because it is always
being perceived by God. Berkeley states,
“…it is plain (things) have an existence
exterior to my mind, since I find them by
experience to be independent of it. There
is therefore some other mind wherein
they exist during the intervals between
the times of my perceiving them, as
likewise they did before my birth, and
would do after my supposed
annihilation. And as the same is true
with regard to all other finite created
spirits, it necessarily follows there is an
omnipresent external Mind which knows
and comprehends all things and exhibits
them to our view in such a manner and
according to such rules as He Himself
has ordained…” (Three Dialogues…Part
III, Section 13).
Is Berkeley’s argument a sound
one? It seems there are several problems
with it. First of all, even if we allow that
premise number one and premise
number two are true (and Berkeley has
done a brilliant job at arguing for these
premises), it seems that we can disagree
with the truthfulness of premise number
three. This is what the skeptic would do.
Has Berkeley shown it to be undeniable
that the world still exists even when we
are not perceiving it? If we can allow the
counter-intuitive idea that matter does
not exist, why can’t we allow that we
don’t know for certain whether the room

will still exist when we leave it?
Berkeley says he knows it “by
experience”. But this does not fit with
the rest of his theory. If all experience
comes from sense perception, and all
sensible things are ideas, then all
experience turns out to be mental. How
can he be sure that everything is not
existing in his own mind? We can still
agree with Berkeley regarding the reality
of ideas and the need for ideas to be
perceived in order to exist, but why must
they be perceived by something other
than ourselves? In effect, Berkeley
needs premise number three to avoid
both skepticism and solipsism. But he
has no real argument for premise number
three.
Berkeley was able to refute
Locke’s materialism because the burden
of proof was on Locke. In other words, it
was up to the materialist to show
evidence for the existence of matter – it
is not up to the doubter to give proof for
the non-existence of something. But
starting at premise number three,
Berkeley is positing the existence of
something without proving it. Now the
burden of proof lies with Berkeley, and
the skeptic can easily dismiss the rest of
his argument by using the same criteria
Berkeley used to defeat Locke. There is
no supporting evidence for premise
number three. For us to accept the
premise, Berkeley must first give
evidence for both God and other minds.
But instead, he uses the premise to infer
the existence of God and other minds.
Berkeley was relentless in his
refutation of the materialist’s evidence
for the existence of matter. But he
himself must also be prepared to be
relentlessly questioned on his case for
God and other minds. Berkeley does try
to give evidence for both God and other
minds, but what he proposes does not

seem solid enough to act as supporting
evidence. Berkeley says that he knows
“intuitively” that he himself exists. He
knows it not through sense perception,
but immediately and through intuitive
notion. He states that he knows God and
other minds in a similar way. (“…I
perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a
notion of Him, or know Him by
reflection and reasoning. My own mind
and my own ideas I have an immediate
knowledge of; and, by the help of these,
do mediately apprehend the possibility
of the existence of other spirits and
ideas.” (Three Dialogues…Part III,
Section 17) In other words, Berkeley
knows himself and God through
intuition, and he knows other minds by
analogy. His reason tells him that if he
as a self exists, then he can assume that
other selves exist too. But this is not an
empiricist answer – it’s based on the
rationalist theory that we can know
things innately. Berkeley began his
argument by establishing that we know
things through sense experience – an
empiricist foundation. But now he has
abandoned that first foundational criteria
in order to make a case for things known
only through intuition.
Berkeley was much better at
tearing down the materialist’s argument
than at building up his own argument for
an idealistic theory of knowledge.
Berkeley effectively proved that we
cannot know that reality is composed of
material substance. But if he stopped
there, he would simply remain a skeptic.
Epistemology is concerned with what we
can know. There has always been a great
gap between our ideas and the reality
which our ideas are supposed to
represent. This gap needs to be
overcome if we are to be able to say that
we have real knowledge. By denying
matter and making the case that reality

consists of ideas, Berkeley tries to close
the gap. He argues that since everything
is an idea, and we can know ideas, then
we can know reality. By overcoming the
gap between reality and ideas, Berkeley
has seemingly overcome skepticism.
But in order to account for ideas,
Berkeley leaves the empirical road he
started on, and ends up on a rationalistic
notion of God. Berkeley’s argument
against materialism is the compelling
part of his theory. He did not propose a
sound enough argument for the rest of
the theory. In this way, empiricism does
not lead to idealism, because it doesn’t
follow necessarily. Instead, if we are to
follow Berkeley’s arguments to their
logical conclusion, empiricism seems to
lead us further toward skepticism.
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